We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies security under concurrent composition. This question is motivated by the folklore that all known protocols that are secure in the informationtheoretic setting are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security of protocols under composition while considering only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.
INTRODUCTION

Background
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some function of their inputs. Loosely speaking, the security requirements of such a computation are that nothing is learned from the protocol other than the output (privacy), and that the output is distributed according to the prescribed functionality (correctness). More exactly, the result of an execution of a secure protocol must be like the result of an "ideal execution" with an incorruptible trusted party who (honestly) computes the function for the parties (cf. [4] or [15, Section 7.1] ). These security requirements must hold in the face of a malicious adversary who controls some subset of the parties and can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol instructions.
Secure multiparty computation has been studied in a number of different scenarios. One important distinction relates to the power of the adversary, yielding two main settings: (I) The information-theoretic setting: In this setting, the adversary is computationally unbounded. Thus, security here does not rely on any unproven complexity assumptions; rather, it is "information theoretic". There are two levels of security that have been considered here:
1. Perfect security: Very informally, here the result of a real execution of the protocol with a real adversary must be exactly the same as the result of an ideal execution with a trusted party and an ideal adversary/simulator.
Statistical security:
Here, the result of the real protocol execution need "only" be statistically close to the result of an ideal execution.
It has been shown that, assuming that more than 2/3 of the parties are honest (or assuming a simple majority if the parties are given a broadcast channel), it is possible to securely compute any functionality [3, 6, 21, 1] . We note that these results assume that the parties can communicate via perfectly-secure communication channels. (II) The computational setting: In this setting, the adversary is assumed to run in probabilistic polynomial-time, and the security of protocols typically relies on the assumed hardness of some problem (like factoring a large composite into its prime factors). Under appropriate cryptographic assumptions, it has been shown that any functionality can be securely computed, even if an overwhelming majority of the parties are corrupted [22, 14] . Another important distinction relates to the network in which the protocol is executed. We relate here to two possible scenarios: (A) The stand-alone model: In this setting, the secure protocol is executed only once, and it is assumed that this is the only protocol being executed. This was the standard setting for analyzing protocols initially, and all of the results of [22, 14, 3, 6, 21 , 1] cited above were obtained in this setting.
(B) Security under composition: In this setting, a protocol is executed many times, possibly alongside other secure and insecure protocols. There are many different types of composition, and we will mention two here:
Concurrent general composition:
In this setting, a protocol is run many times in an arbitrary network. That is, the protocol may be run alongside other secure and insecure protocols, again with the scheduling being fully controlled by the adversary. See [10, 20, 5] for initial works that considered this setting.
Concurrent self composition:
In this setting, a single protocol is run many times concurrently in a network. Formally, "concurrency" means that the adversary has full control over the scheduling of all messages sent by the honest parties. See [12, 9, 11] for initial works that considered this setting.
We note that recently, the question of security of protocols under concurrent composition has received a lot of attention.
It is believed that all protocols (or at least, all known protocols) that are secure in the information-theoretic setting, even when proven only as stand-alone, are secure under concurrent composition. In this paper, we study this interesting connection between information-theoretic security and security under composition. Our aim in initiating this study is twofold. First, as our results demonstrate, understanding this connection deepens our understanding of what is required for obtaining security under composition. Second, due to its complex nature, the task of proving the security of protocols under composition is a difficult one and we obtain a number of results that simplify this task.
Our Results
As we have mentioned, the accepted folklore prior to our work seems to have been that all known protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic stand-alone setting are also secure under concurrent general composition. The reason for this folklore appears to be based on the fact that all known protocols in the information-theoretic setting are proven using a straight-line black-box simulator, 2 and the existence of such a simulator was believed to suffice for proving the security of a protocol under concurrent general composition. We begin by showing that this folklore is false. That is, we obtain the following informally stated proposition: Beyond its theoretical interest, Theorem 1.2 provides a useful tool for proving the security of perfectly-secure protocols under concurrent composition. Specifically, it suffices to consider the standard stand-alone definitions (e.g. of [4] , building on [13, 2, 19] ), and security is automatically derived in the far more complex setting of composition (as long as a black-box straight-line simulator is constructed). Thus, a corollary of Theorem 1.2 is that the protocol of [3] is secure under concurrent general composition.
3 In addition to the above, contrasting Theorem 1.2 to Proposition 1.1 demonstrates that perfectly secure protocols have a real advantage over statistically secure protocols and perfect security is not just an issue of aesthetics.
We remark that under strictly more stringent conditions a theorem similar to Theorem 1.2 was proven in [10] , and the theorem of [10] is also sufficient to derive the security of [3] under concurrent general composition. See the related work for a more detailed comparison of their work with ours.
Self composition.
As we have seen, straight-line blackbox simulation (without perfect security) is insufficient for obtaining security under concurrent general composition. In contrast, we show that straight-line black-box simulation does suffice for obtaining security for weaker forms of composition. To describe this result, we will first recall some results regarding security under composition. As we have described, there are two main types of composition: concurrent general composition and concurrent self composition. Although the setting of general composition seems to be much more stringent, it was shown in [18] that these notions are equivalent for a large class of protocols. However, this equivalence was only shown when the setting of self composition is such that the honest parties may choose their inputs adaptively, based on outputs that they have received from executions that have already terminated. A possibly weaker setting is that of fixed inputs, where each honest party receives all of its inputs before any execution begins. (That is, at the onset, each party receives a vector of inputs x = (x1, x2, . . .) and uses xi as its input in the i th execution.) We note that despite the fact that this looks like a more relaxed notion, until now there was no known separation between security under concurrent self composition with fixed or with adaptively-chosen inputs. Now, by the equivalence shown in [18] , we cannot hope to prove that black-box straight-line simulation suffices for obtaining security under concurrent self composition with adaptively-chosen inputs (because this would imply security under concurrent general composition, in contradiction to Proposition 1.1). Nevertheless, we do prove the following: [6, 21, 7] , that are all statistically-secure and have straight-line black-box simulators, are secure under concurrent self composition with fixed inputs.
In addition to the above, by combining Theorem 1.3 with Proposition 1.1 (and applying the equivalence proven in [18] ), we obtain the first separation between security under self composition with fixed inputs and adaptively-chosen inputs. That is, we have the following corollary: This corollary is obtained by taking a protocol that has a black-box straight-line simulator but is not secure under concurrent general composition, and thus is not secure under concurrent self composition with adaptively-chosen inputs. Such a protocol exists by Proposition 1.1. (Actually, we have to show that the equivalence of [18] holds with respect to the protocol referred to in Proposition 1.1; we demonstrate this at the end of Section 3.) Next, we apply Theorem 1.3 to this protocol, and derive that it is secure under concurrent self composition with fixed inputs. We note that although this corollary is not of direct relevance to the main results of this paper, it is an interesting by-product.
Black-box simulation. Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 require the black-box simulator to be straight-line. We now ask whether in the information-theoretic setting there exists a protocol that has a rewinding simulator but does not have a straightline simulator. In other words, is it possible to transform any rewinding simulator into one that is straight-line. In light of our above results, this would answer the question of whether or not every protocol that is information-theoretically secure and has a black-box simulator is secure under composition (even if its simulator uses a "rewinding" strategy). We answer this question positively as follows. versary is not computationally bounded, such a simulator suffices for deriving security. However, sometimes it is required that the runningtime of the simulator be polynomial in the running-time of the adversary. One reason that you may wish this property is to be able to derive that any protocol that is secure in the information-theoretic setting is also secure in the computational setting, where all machines are limited to polynomial-time. Theorems 1.6 and 1.7 provide rather weak security guarantees because the simulator is inefficient. In particular, protocols that are information-theoretically secure in this sense are not necessarily secure in the computational setting. An interesting question left open by our work is whether or not it is possible to obtain analogs of these theorems with "efficient simulation".
Initial synchronization. Finally, we ask if there exists a simple property such that any protocol having a straight-line black-box simulator and this property is guaranteed to be secure under concurrent general composition. We answer this question positively, by introducing a property called initial synchronization. Informally, a protocol is said to have initial synchronization if all parties announce that they are ready to start before they actually start. This has the effect of ensuring that the actual protocol execution only begins after all parties' inputs have already been fixed (because no party begins until it hears from all other parties that they are ready to start, meaning that they already have input). We prove the following theorem: We remark that Theorem 1.8 holds for computational, statistical and perfect security. Since any protocol can easily be modified so that it has initial synchronization, we achieve the following corollary (informally stated): Corollary 1.9. Assuming a broadcast channel and honest majority, every functionality can be realized by a statistically secure protocol under concurrent general composition. Corollary 1.9 is obtained by applying Theorem 1.8 to the protocols of [21, 1] , once modified by adding initial synchronization. We remark that this is the first proof of the existence of such protocols. The main novelty here is the proof that there exist protocols that achieve fairness in the setting of concurrent general composition, assuming an honest majority. (Previously, this was only known for the case that more than two thirds of the parties are honest.)
Summary. See Table 1 for a summary of all our results; the first column shows the section in which the result is proven; the security level "all" means that the result holds for computational, statistical and perfect security.
Concurrent composition and network synchrony.
In this paper, we consider protocols that were proven secure in the stand-alone model, and analyze their security in the setting of composition. The stand-alone setting in which these protocols were initially analyzed may have considered a synchronous network, or an asynchronous network. In contrast, the concurrent setting is inherently asynchronous since the adversary has full control over message delivery. Our theorems therefore actually assume that the stand-alone protocols referred to were designed for the asynchronous setting.
In contrast, protocols that were designed for the stand-alone synchronous model only cannot be translated to the concurrent setting because these protocols advance from round to round based on some clock (or round synchronizer), and not based on the messages that are received. There are two ways to address this issue: the first option is to assume that the adversary is semi-synchronous; i.e. it can schedule messages of various protocols in any interleaving manner which it wishes, but messages of a single round of a specific protocol must be delivered together (for a formulation of this notion see [5, Section 6.4] ). The second option allows the adversary to schedule all messages in any order it wishes. However, in this case we modify the stand-alone synchronous protocol so that honest parties are instructed to wait for all of their round i messages before sending their messages from round i + 1. (We can also assume that honest parties concatenate the round index to every message they send.) Such modifications can be trivially made to every protocol in the synchronous setting without affecting its security, except that output delivery is no longer guaranteed. This is not a limitation because output is not guaranteed in any case in the full concurrent setting -the adversary can simply block all messages. We remark that our method using "initial synchronization" enables the adversary to prevent the honest parties from completing the computation. It is therefore well-suited to the case where the protocol taken is designed for the synchronous model, and the adversary is assumed to have full control over message delivery. (This is because the adversary can already cause the computation to abort, and nothing is lost by adding the initial synchronization phase. ) We also remark that the results obtained by starting with a synchronous or asynchronous protocol are incomparable, in that each has an advantage over the other. Choosing an asynchronous protocol has the advantage that the adversary cannot prevent the protocol from terminating successfully. However, as is typical for this model, it is possible that not all of the honest parties' inputs will be taken into account in the protocol output. In contrast, assuming a synchronous protocol with full scheduling on the part of the adversary suffers from easy denial of service attacks, but honest parties' inputs cannot be excluded. (Note that in an election protocol, it is arguably better to let the adversary force a protocol abort, than to let it exclude a percentage of the honest parties' votes.) We therefore conclude that there is some trade-off which needs to be taken into account when choosing the type of protocol from the stand-alone setting that will be used in the setting of concurrent composition.
Related Work
As we have mentioned, the composition of informationtheoretic protocols was previously studied in [10] . They showed that any protocol that is secure under their definition (which is a slight modification of the definition of [19] ) is secure under concurrent general composition. There are three main requirements in the definition considered in [10] : (a) the protocol must be perfectly secure, (b) a straightline black-box simulator must be used, and (c) there must be a fixed "committal round" at which point all of the parties' inputs are fully defined by the protocol traffic, but no parties have yet received output. In contrast, our proof of Theorem 1.2 requires (a) and (b), but no special committal round. (We note that the proof of [10] relies explicitly on this property, as they state in Section 4.3.) Apart from Theorem 1.2, there is no overlap between our work and the work of [10] . Indeed, they leave the question of statistical security open, and we provide both positive and negative answers (depending on the setting).
DEFINITIONS
Due to lack of space in this extended abstract, we refer the reader to other sources for definitions. General definitions of secure multiparty computation in the stand-alone model can be found in [4] and [15, Chapter 7] . For definitions of secure multiparty computation in the setting of concurrent general composition, see [17] and [5] . We also consider concurrent self composition in this work in two variants: where the honest parties start with fixed inputs and where there inputs can be adaptively chosen. Definitions for these settings can be found in [16] and [18] . Our results are proven for static adversaries; the extension to adaptive adversaries will appear in the full version.
COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO FOLKLORE
It seems to be well-accepted folklore that any protocol that is secure with a straight-line black-box simulator is secure under concurrent composition. This folklore probably stems from the fact that all known protocols for the information-theoretic setting have black-box straight-line simulators and are assumed (though most of them do not have proofs) to be secure under concurrent composition. In this section we show that this folklore is false. Specifically, we present a protocol that is statistically secure and has a straight-line black-box simulator, yet is not secure under concurrent general composition. (Recall that in the setting of concurrent general composition, a secure protocol runs concurrently to arbitrary other protocols.) We note that the simulator that we present for this protocol also runs in polynomial-time. Thus, the counter-example holds also for the computational setting.
The main idea behind our counter-example is as follows. In the stand-alone model, the parties' inputs are all fixed before the execution begins. In contrast, in the setting of concurrent general composition, a party's input to the secure protocol may depend on messages that it receives in another protocol. Furthermore, since the scheduling is concurrent (and controlled by the adversary), it is possible that a party's input to a secure protocol ρ is defined after other parties have already begun running ρ. Such an event cannot happen in the stand-alone model, where all the parties' inputs are fixed before the execution begins.
Universal composability -discussion. We note that our example highlights an important issue regarding the definition of universal composability [5] . Namely, this definition has two stringencies over other definitions. First, it requires that the simulator be straight-line and black-box. Second, it requires that the inputs may be chosen adaptively (by an external environment). It seems to have been generally believed (although not stated in [5] ) that the first stringency is the main one needed for achieving composition. Our example shows that both are actually necessary. 
Proof:
We begin by presenting a three-party protocol that realizes the function f (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 0, 0) with statistical security in the stand-alone model and with black-box straight-line simulation, in the case of an honest majority. Intuitively, Protocol 1 is secure in the stand-alone model because P3 only outputs 1 in the case that r equals its input. However, since at least one of P1 or P2 is honest, and thus chooses ri at random (i ∈ {1, 2}), the probability that r equals P3's input is at most 2 −n/2 . 
The idea behind the proof of this claim is that the input of P3 is not necessarily fixed before P1 and P2 start running their protocol. Since we are working in a concurrent setting, this is inevitable. We begin by describing a protocol π that contains an ideal call to f . (The protocol π is the "arbitrary protocol" that runs concurrent to the secure Protocol 1.)
Arbitrary protocol π:
1. Party P1 sends a random string s ∈R {0, 1} n to P3.
2. Parties P1 and P2 send the trusted party computing f the input 0 n .
3. Party P3 sends the trusted party computing f the input s (as received from P1) and outputs whatever output it receives back from the trusted party.
4. Parties P1 and P2 record their outputs whenever they receive them from the trusted party and they output these recorded values. Consider now a real execution of π with Protocol 1 replacing the trusted computation of f (Steps 2-4), and an adversary A who controls a corrupted P1. In such an execution, parties P1 and P2 begin running Protocol 1. (Note that P3 does not start running Protocol 1 until it receives its input s from P1 in π.) P1 receives a string r2 from the honest P2 and chooses its own random r1. The adversarial strategy of A controlling P1 here is to send s = r = (r1, r2) to P3 as part of the protocol π (i.e., Step 1 in Protocol π), and to send r1 to P2 as part of Protocol 1 (i.e., Step 2 in Protocol 1). A then proceeds with Protocol 1 following the instructions of P1 honestly. (In particular, it sends r = (r1, r2) to P3 and outputs 0.)
Notice that in a real execution of π with Protocol 1 and adversary A, in Protocol 1 party P3 always receives messages from P1 and P2 that equal its input x3. This is because P3 sets its input x3 to equal s, and P1 is able to make s = r. Therefore, P3 always outputs 1 from such an execution of Protocol 1 with π and A. By the definition of π, this means that P3 also always outputs 1 from π in such an execution with A. (Recall that in a real execution of π with Protocol 1, the output of f is replaced with the output of Protocol 1.)
It remains to note that for all simulators working in a hybrid/ideal model where π is run together with an ideal call to a trusted party computing f , the output of the honest parties P2 and P3 from π is always 0, because this is the output always sent by the trusted party. Therefore, the output of the real and ideal (hybrid) executions are easily distinguishable. This completes the proof of Claim 3.3.
Proposition 3.1 follows from Claims 3.2 and 3.3.
Concurrent self-composition with adaptively chosen inputs. The above counter-example relates to the case of concurrent general composition. We now show that it can be extended also to the case of concurrent self-composition with adaptively chosen inputs. Recall that there exist functions (in fact many) for which security under concurrent general composition is equivalent to security under concurrent self composition with adaptively chosen inputs [18] . Intuitively, this implies that the counter-example also should hold here. However, to prove that this is the case, we need to provide a counter-example for a function for which the equivalence holds. By [18] , these functions include the functions that enable "bit transmission". For example, the function f (x1, x2, x3) = (0, x1, 0) suffices. 5 The counter-example above can be modified so that it holds for this function f . In order to do this, we just need to modify Protocol 1 so that Party P1 sends P2 its input x1 at the onset of the execution. Then, P2 outputs whatever P1 sent it, and P3's output is determined in the same way as in Protocol 1. The proof of this modified f stays almost the same as above. We therefore obtain:
. Assuming an honest majority of participants, there exists a function f and a protocol that realizes f with statistical/computational security in the standalone model and with black-box straight-line simulation, but is not secure under concurrent self composition with adaptively chosen inputs.
PERFECT SECURITY & CONCURRENT GENERAL COMPOSITION
Proposition 3.1 states that black-box straight-line simulation and statistical security do not suffice for achieving security under concurrent general composition. In this section, we show that if the protocol has a black-box straightline simulator and is perfectly secure, then it is secure under concurrent general composition. 
Proof:
The idea behind the proof of this theorem is as follows. Assume, by contradiction, that ρ is not secure under concurrent general composition. Loosely speaking, this means that there exists a protocol π and an adversary A such that a real execution of π and ρ with A cannot be simulated in the hybrid world where π is run together with a trusted party who computes f . 6 In particular, it must be that the output distribution of the adversary and honest parties in ρ when running ρ together with π is not the same as their output distribution when they just send their inputs 5 In [18] there is also a distinction between a setting of fixed roles and interchangeable roles. For simplicity, here we refer only to the setting of interchangeable roles. 6 We remark that we prove the theorem directly for security under concurrent general composition, without going through the definition of universal composability [5] . Those who feel more comfortable using universal composability can just think of the protocol π as the environment Z and everything remains the same.
to a trusted party computing f . The main idea here is to use this fact to attack a stand-alone execution of ρ. Specifically, we construct a stand-alone adversary Aρ who attacks ρ by internally simulating the entire π execution for A, while running the protocol ρ externally with the honest parties. If Aρ's simulation of π is "good", then it follows that the stand-alone execution of ρ will be the same as when it is run together with π. Thus, the output of ρ in this stand-alone execution will not be the same as the output of an ideal execution with a trusted party computing f . The problem with this approach is that in order for Aρ's simulation of π to be "good", it must somehow guess the honest party's inputs and random coin tosses in a way that will make the combination of the internal π simulation and the external ρ execution look the same as a full external execution of π with ρ. This is especially problematic because in the setting of concurrent general composition, the honest party's inputs to ρ may be determined by π, whereas in the stand-alone model, the inputs of the honest parties are fixed ahead of time. Nevertheless, in the case of perfect security, this is not a problem because we only need Aρ's attack on ρ to "succeed" with nonzero probability. In particular, even a statistical distance of 2
−n
O (1) between the real and ideal executions is not allowed. Now, with very small probability, Aρ's guesses are "correct", and in this case, the output distribution and execution of ρ with Aρ is the same as after an execution of π and ρ with A. By the contradicting assumption, this output distribution is not simulatable in the ideal model, and so we have that the real and ideal distributions are not identical, in contradiction to the perfect security of ρ in the stand-alone model. We note that the above contains the main idea behind the proof. However, the structure of the actual proof is a little different. We now proceed to the formal proof.
In this proof, without loss of generality, we only consider the case that the arbitrary protocol π has a single ideal call to f . We note that in the case that a single universal simulator is provided for all protocols π (as will be the case here), this is equivalent to the case that π has any polynomial number of ideal calls to f (see the full version of [17] for a proof). We denote by realπρ,A(x) the distribution of the outputs of the adversary A and the honest parties, upon input vector x, in a real execution of π with ρ. Likewise, we denote by hybrid f π,S (x) the distribution of the outputs of the adversary S and the honest parties, upon input vector x, in a hybrid execution of π with a trusted party computing f .
Let f be a function, let ρ be a protocol that realizes f with perfect security, and let Sρ be the black-box straightline ideal-model simulator for ρ that is assumed to exist. Then, we construct a simulator S for the setting of concurrent general composition as follows. Let A be a real-model adversary and let π be an arbitrary protocol that contains a single ideal call to f . Then, S invokes the real adversary A and forwards all π-messages untouched between A and the honest parties (recall that S runs a real execution of π with external parties). In contrast, when A begins the ρ execution, S invokes a copy of Sρ and forwards all ρ-messages between A and Sρ (in contrast to the π-messages that are sent externally, ρ is internally simulated by S using Sρ). More specifically, when A produces a ρ-message to be sent to an honest party, S hands this message to Sρ. Likewise, Sρ's reply is handed back to A as if coming from an honest party. In addition, whenever Sρ sends an input to the trusted party computing f , simulator S sends the same input. Likewise, outputs sent to S from the trusted party are forwarded to Sρ. (We note that the π execution continues by just forwarding π-messages between A and the honest parties, even while the simulation of ρ takes place. Notice that the real execution of π can continue concurrently with the simulation of ρ because Sρ is straight-line, and so never needs to rewind.
7 ) Whenever A halts, simulator S copies A's output to its own output tape and halts.
We now prove that for every arbitrary protocol π (with a single ideal call to f ), every real adversary A and every vector of inputs x,
Assume, by contradiction, that this is not the case. This implies that there exists a protocol π, an adversary A and a vector of inputs x such that Eq. (1) does not hold. First, assume that the output of each honest party in π includes its local output from the ideal call to f (or likewise, its local output from the execution of ρ). Clearly Eq. (1) does not hold here as well, because we only provided more output. Next, modify the protocol π to π so that the honest parties output their local output from f (or ρ) only, and not their original π-output. This is the only difference between π and π . In particular, the honest parties run π to the end as before, following the same instructions. We now claim that Eq. (1) also does not hold with respect to π . That is,
This requires justification because in π the output distribution is different (and contains less "information"). In order to see that Eq. (2) holds, we show that if this were not the case, then Eq. (1) would hold. This follows from the fact that the only difference between hybrid f π,S (x) and realπρ,A(x) for the honest parties is that the output from f is obtained from the trusted party in hybrid and from the execution of ρ in real. Therefore, if these outputs from ρ are identically distributed in hybrid and real, this implies that the honest parties' outputs from π are identically distributed in hybrid and real. (This is not necessarily true for the adversary's output. However, the adversary's output is unchanged in π and π .) This contradicts the assumption that Eq. (1) does not hold, and so we conclude that Eq. (2) holds. Now, let xρ be a vector of inputs to ρ such that in the event that the inputs determined by π to f (or equivalently to ρ) equal xρ, the hybrid f π ,S (x) and real π ρ ,A (x) distributions are not identical. Such a vector of inputs xρ to ρ must exist, because otherwise the hybrid and real distributions would be identical. (More formally, we can break up the distributions of hybrid f π ,S (x) and real π ρ ,A (x) according to all possible sets of inputs to f and ρ in an execution of π with x. Then, it must be that for at least one of these "sub-distributions", the hybrid and real distributions are not identical.)
We are now ready to construct an adversary Aρ that attacks a stand-alone execution of ρ, and succeeds when the 7 If Sρ were to rewind A, then a problem would arise in the case that a π-message that A sent before rewinding is changed by A after rewinding. In particular, since these messages are sent externally to honest parties, they cannot be changed at a later stage.
input vector to ρ equals xρ. Adversary Aρ works by internally emulating all the honest parties in the execution of π , and externally running the ρ execution. Specifically, Aρ sets the inputs of the (internally-emulated) parties running π to x, and also chooses uniformly distributed random-tapes for these parties. Then, Aρ invokes A and perfectly emulates an execution of real π ρ ,A (x), by passing all π -messages between A and the internally-emulated honest parties. In contrast, when the execution of ρ is reached, Aρ sends A's ρ-messages externally to the real honest parties running ρ. Likewise, ρ-messages received externally by Aρ are internally handed back to A. We note that the internal emulation of π continues concurrently to the external execution of ρ (according to the scheduling determined by A) . At the end of the external execution of ρ, adversary Aρ guesses the outputs of the honest parties in ρ and uses them in the continuation of the internal emulation of π. (This guess can be made efficient by just guessing random strings of the appropriate length. It is not necessary to ensure that the guessed outputs always fall in the range of f .) Aρ continues this internal emulation of π until A halts. At this point Aρ outputs A's output, as well as its guesses for the honest parties' inputs to ρ and their outputs. Aρ then halts.
First, observe that with nonzero probability, the inputs of the internally-emulated honest parties to ρ equal xρ (and therefore match the real inputs of the external parties). Furthermore, the guess of Aρ with respect to the honest parties' outputs from ρ is also correct with nonzero probability. Now, conditioned on these guesses being correct, the output of the honest parties from ρ along with the portion of Aρ's output that is copied from A's output is distributed exactly according to real π ρ ,A (x). Furthermore, in an ideal-model simulation by Sρ, once again conditioned on the guesses being correct, the output of the (ideal) honest parties along with the appropriate portion of Sρ's output is distributed exactly according to hybrid f π ,S (x). Notice finally that because Aρ outputs its guesses for the inputs and outputs of the honest parties (and whether or not they are correct can be derived by comparing Aρ's output to the real inputs and outputs of the honest parties), the "subdistribution" of the guesses of Aρ being correct is disjoint from the case that the guesses of Aρ are incorrect. Since it follows from the contradicting assumption that this subdistribution is not identically distributed in the real and ideal executions, we conclude that
in contradiction to the perfect security of ρ with the blackbox simulator Sρ.
The "furthermore" in the theorem statement relating to the simulator's complexity follows from the fact that S as constructed merely invokes A and the simulator Sρ for ρ. Thus, if Sρ runs in time that is polynomial in the runningtime of A, so does S. This completes the proof.
Since the simulator constructed in Theorem 4.1 runs in time that is polynomial in the complexity of the adversary we have the following corollary: Private channels. Recall that in the information-theoretic model, ideal private channels are assumed. However, they are not assumed in the computational model (and we wish to use information-theoretic protocols in the computational setting). This problem can be solved by using secure channels that are secure under concurrent general composition. Such protocols for secure channels exist; see [8] .
BLACK-BOX STRAIGHT-LINE SIMULA-TION AND SELF COMPOSITION
Proposition 3.1 states that black-box straight-line simulation does not suffice for achieving security under concurrent general composition. In this section, we show that it does however suffice for achieving security under concurrent selfcomposition with fixed inputs. The exact definitions we use for concurrent self-composition appear in the full version of this paper, and are almost identical to the definitions that appear in [16] . We note that the i th session is initiated by the adversary sending a message (start-session, i) to the honest parties. We also note that we adopt the convention that all messages sent are of the form (i, α), meaning that α belongs to the i th execution. This convention is used for regular messages in a real execution, and also for messages sent to and from the trusted party in the ideal model. Recall that in the setting of fixed inputs, each party receives a vector of inputs before any execution begins. Then, in the i th (concurrent) execution, the honest party's input is the i th value in its input vector. Recall also that security is required to hold for all possible vectors of inputs of all possible lengths (that is, we quantify over all adversaries, all polynomials p(·), and all possible vectors of inputs of length p(n)). 
Proof:
The proof is essentially the same for the computational, statistical and perfect cases. Our actual proof will relate to the computational case (which is typically the most problematic); the other cases can be immediately derived through minor modifications.
Let ρ be an n-party protocol that realizes some probabilistic polynomial-time function f with computational security in the stand-alone model, and let Sρ be a probabilistic polynomial-time black-box straight-line simulator for ρ. 8 Let A be a real adversary for this concurrent setting. We construct a simulator S as follows:
and note that security must also hold in this scenario. We also note that a black-box simulator does not receive the real adversary's auxiliary input.) Adversary A begins by choosing a random index j ∈R {1, . . . , m}, with the "hope" that j = k (i.e., j will define the hybrid that D succeeds in distinguishing). Then, A internally invokes A and perfectly emulates for A the ideal world for the first j executions and the real world for the last m − j − 1 executions. (Specifically, A plays the ideal honest parties, S th execution externally. That is, when A sends a message (start-session, j + 1) to all parties, then A begins interacting with the external honest parties. Furthermore, when A sends a message (j + 1, m) that is meant for an honest party P k , then A sends this message to the real external honest party P k that it interacts with. Likewise, upon receiving any message m from this real P k , adversary A hands A the message (j + 1, m) as if it came from P k . This concludes the description of A .
Notice that when A runs in the real world, and the inputs of the parties in the external j th execution are defined as x 1 j , . . . , x n j (from the vectors x 1 , . . . , x n ), then the distribution that is generated is exactly that of Hj. In contrast, when the simulator Sρ is invoked for adversary A and the inputs of the external execution are as above, the resulting distribution is exactly that of Hj+1. 10 Since j = k with probability 1 m (where k is the hybrid that D succeeds in distinguishing with non-negligible probability), we have that there exists a setting of inputs for which the distinguisher D above distinguishes the stand-alone real execution of ρ with A from a stand-alone ideal execution with Sρ, with nonnegligible probability. (This setting of inputs is obtained by setting party Pi's input to equal x i k .) This contradicts the stand-alone security of ρ with simulator Sρ. We therefore conclude that ρ realizes the function f under concurrent self composition with fixed inputs.
BLACK BOX SIMULATION
The proofs of both Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 5.1 rely heavily on the fact that the black-box simulator is straightline. In this section we show that in the information theoretic setting, any protocol which has a black-box simulator also has a straight-line black box simulator, albeit an inefficient one (i.e., the simulator may run in exponential-time, even if the adversary runs in polynomial-time). Thus, if the protocol is perfect or statistically secure, and efficient simulation is not required, then any black-box simulator suffices. Specifically, by combining the following theorem with Theorems 4.1 and 5.1, we obtain that any protocol that is perfectly secure is secure under concurrent general compo- 10 We stress that this argument fails in the case of adaptively chosen inputs. In particular, if honest parties choose their inputs based on previously obtained outputs, then the inputs of the real, external honest parties in the (j + 1) th session would depend on the executions that are internally emulated by A . In this case, the real inputs of the honest parties in the external execution may not be consistent with the emulation. Furthermore, the inputs chosen later in the internal emulation cannot depend on the honest parties' outputs in the (j + 1) th execution, because A is not given these outputs.
sition, and any protocol that is statistically secure is secure under concurrent self composition with fixed inputs. The idea behind the proof is to build a non-rewinding simulator S that emulates the given rewinding simulator S R . Simulator S first fixes the randomness of S R and then internally emulates an execution of S R with all possible adversaries, obtaining an output transcript for each one (these transcripts contains the series of messages supposedly sent in the execution and is the output generated by S R in its simulation). Based on these internally constructed transcripts, S determines the message that is actually sent out to the true adversary A with which it is communicating. It does this in the following way: Upon receiving a new message from A, the simulator S eliminates all the adversaries (i.e., internal transcripts) that are inconsistent with the communication thus far. It then sends the next message from any of the remaining transcripts, and the procedure is repeated again. This strategy ensures that each message sent to the adversary is distributed in the same way as in the final output generated by S R after interacting with the adversary. Thus, no rewinding is needed (because the "correct" message is sent first time). Now, at some point in the simulation, S R extracts the inputs used by the corrupted parties. Once this point is reached, S extracts the inputs from the adversary and calls the functionality to receive the output of the function. It then continues to determine the messages sent in the same way as before; i.e., by internally emulating all possible simulations and continuing with those that are consistent with the real responses received from the adversary in the simulation. In the full proof, we show that this process yields a "good" straight line simulation for the protocol π.
Combining this theorem with the theorems from previous sections we obtain Theorems 1.6 and 1.7 stated in the Introduction.
STRAIGHT-LINE BLACK-BOX SIMULA-TION AND INITIAL SYNCHRONIZATION
Proposition 3.1 states that statistical security and blackbox straight-line simulation does not suffice for achieving security under concurrent general composition. In this section, we show that a mild additional requirement can be made on the protocol so that it does suffice. Namely, we prove that if a secure protocol has a black-box straight-line simulator, and no party sends any message that depends on its input or random-tape until all parties have announced that they have started, then the protocol is secure under concurrent general composition. This result holds for all levels of security, even computational security.
Initial synchronization. We say that a protocol ρ has initial synchronization if it begins with the following steps:
1. Send "begin ρ" to all parties 2. Upon receiving a "begin ρ" message from all other parties, continue the execution of ρ. We stress that the inputs to the protocol are read by each party before it sends its begin ρ message, and are therefore fixed before the actual execution of ρ begins (or, more exactly, before any honest party sends a message that depends on its input or random tape). Proof idea: The case of perfect security follows from Theorem 4.1, even without initial synchronization. The interesting cases are therefore those of computational and statistical security. The intuition behind the proof of this theorem comes from the counter-example of Section 3. Specifically, recall that the security of the protocol described in that counter-example is compromised by having one party's input depend on messages sent by the other parties in ρ itself. When there is initial synchronization, this cannot happen. Technically, the proof utilizes initial synchronization by the following observation. Assume that all of the parties' inputs to ρ in a concurrent execution with some protocol π, depend only on π. That is, the parties' inputs do not depend on anything that takes place within the execution of ρ (as is indeed guaranteed when there is initial synchronization). Then, the entire computation of π can be incorporated into an auxiliary input for an adversary attacking a stand-alone execution of ρ. We can then apply the stand-alone security of ρ to derive security under concurrent general composition. In slightly more detail, assuming the existence of a black-box straight-line simulator Sρ for ρ in the stand-alone model, we construct a simulator S for ρ in the setting of concurrent general composition (with an arbitrary protocol π). As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the simulator S just forwards the messages of π between the real adversary and the honest parties. In contrast, the messages of ρ are "dealt with" by Sρ. The key point to note is that due to the initial synchronization phase, the inputs of the parties to ρ are independent of the ρ execution. Therefore, any adversary A who successfully attacks an execution of ρ together with some protocol π can be used by an adversary Aρ to attack a stand-alone execution of ρ. The adversary Aρ receives auxiliary input that includes the honest parties inputs and random tapes for π, and emulates their actions in π. We can then show that the simulation of Aρ by Sρ yields the same distribution as the simulation of A by S. Thus, if S's simulation fails, so does Sρ's, in contradiction to the assumed security of ρ in the stand-alone model. There are two crucial points in this strategy. First, Sρ is a black-box simulator and so it cannot utilize the auxiliary input that is given to Aρ (i.e., Sρ's behavior is the same in the emulation by Aρ and when it is used by S). Second, as we have mentioned, initial synchronization implies that the honest parties' inputs to ρ are not correlated to their random tapes in ρ. This is crucial because in the stand-alone setting, the inputs are fixed ahead of time.
As we have stated in the Introduction, an important corollary of Theorem 7.1 is the existence of statistically-secure protocols for the case of an honest majority, that remain secure under concurrent general composition.
